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Whether and how the free variation is bound in an eidetic and pure psychology with respect to a transcendental phenomenology. <Search for the eidos “pure subjectivity“ in contrast to the eidos “subjectivity experiencing the world“. Research of the limits of variability: bodiless subjects, madmen, animals, etc.>[[1]](#footnote-1)

The eidetic pure psychology aims at systematically developing the apriori of a soul as such, a possible real soul of a real organism in a possible world.

But we need to point out that, if I go back to pure consciousness in the psychic, and freely vary some given thing in the frame of pure options and accordances, I do not ask at all, and cannot ask at first, whether I remain in the frame of a pure soul. I can, as soon as I have the pure ground, even vary the universally accordant experience in such a way that it would become discordant, etc.

My keeping a pure soul *a priori* implies that the psychic nexus of consciousness implicitly entails a universal accordant world experience, in which the soul‘s body constitutes itself as its functioning body, „in“ which it is active in a perceiving way, and „mechanically“ operating externally, etc.

On the other hand it is clear that I cannot begin pure psychology otherwise than by my performing epoché at me first of all with regard to all transcendent acceptances, and [by] turning the view to the own-essentiality of the psychic, in order to then take it into free variation for eidetic purposes. As soon as I do that, I move in a width of pure subjectivity that no longer is or needs to be soul. And only if, after the actually universal and free variation, and after setting up correspondent general essential laws, I raise the question as to whether my soul that is altered in eidetic option actually [355] could still be soul in this freedom, I can become aware of binding essential restrictions being here, simply belonging to a soul as a soul. Obviously not this is the question, what can belong to the universal unit of an ego and of a pure life belonging to it as consciousness life.

But here indeed I find myself already within actually transcendental considerations. Because, how do I arrive at the abovementioned question? I had gone over to my de facto pure internality, and I said to myself that this was my own-essentiality in its purety. If I now perform free variation, then I do not arrive at the thought first of all that I gain something else by that - since it is a free change of my psychic proper essence - than the idea of a soul as such.

It is different if I reflect the known things: If I begin with the study of my pure stream of consciousness and its essential structures, then I also find the external perception as a set of types therein, and I also find the universal stream of unity of external experience, in which the world is given to me as objectively lasting temporally in doubtless empirical certainty. I cannot only consider a single finite relative unity and complex types of mental living in purely psychological eidetics, and bring out essential generalities by free variation, but also treat types of synthetic universal infinities, like for example that of a universal external perception, in this way. I can thus think in a varying way of quite another universal experience in pure consciousness than that, which I actually live, and I have to discern then that I then was not only a thereby changed I as such (although still the same I, but simply with quite another life), but that then quite another world instead of the world de facto accepted by me would have to be accepted by me in doubtless certainty. It would then as now be completely unacceptable for me that there was another world than the one that consequently has presented and presents itself to me simply through my experience as being. I get clear about my experience and its universality being the only thing, by which a world being for me does and can make sense and be accepted. It is purely and simply impossible for me to accept another world as actual than the one I <have> experience<d>, and which would present itself in the course of experience in the sense of a [356] universal accordance verfying itself in itself. And if I still have to consider as possible how ever far reaching illusions, it is *a priori* sure in unconditional certainty that the idea of a possible, actually true world can only be accepted as a correlate of the idea of a universal accordance presenting itself in the course of experience, in which all former illusion (that added to an accordance of former experience prior to its uncovering) would be corrected, and thereby accordance of the verification would be reproduced, and considered sustaining for all future.

On the other hand though it also becomes clear to me that a universal accordant external experience as with me, the de facto I, is something factual in every possible change of my I from the free variation of its stream of consciousness that could also be different, and not only different in the sense of another universal and accordant experience. Because I also see the option that the discordances cannot only be removed by corrections, but that they also, ever again exhibiting themselves in consequence, could lead to my being forced to negate every objectively true being, that is, the whole spatio-temporal world in the end. I cognize that the „I am“, my own being with <a> proper essence of any stream content, cannot be annulled, and remains, even if there was no world for me at all in doubtless certainty of experience. Thus, presupposing this case of non-being of an experiential world, I would not have a body, non would be given to me through external experience, and this means: demonstrably and in a demonstrated way, and thereby I, together with my life still streaming away and inseparable from me, would not be a soul of a body.

Thus I cognize that the phenomenological reduction of my soul, as soon as free variation bonds to it, does not result in the eidos pure soul, but in a far more general eidos - that of a transcendental subjectivity, and that it is therefore a special eidetic binding, the demand that the transcendental subjectivity shall be one that constitutes the world, lenting the essential character of a soul to it.

But this consideration still needs a supplement: We restrict it to the objection that still some subjectivity, for example mine, [357] could be soul of a body in objective truth, without its [the soul‘s] experiencing it [the body], and accordingly, without its experiencing anything of an objective world. Yet, if a world is or even only possibly is, then it still needs to be imaginable as a being or a possibly being one. But a world is imaginable as one presenting and verifying itself accordantly in possible experience, that is, with relation to a possible correspondent subject of possible experience and cognition of experience. If we ourselves speak of the option of a world and with reason, that is, with insight into this option, then we ourselves are subjects of possible experience of it. If it is our de facto world, then it is the de facto consequence of an accordant total experience, in which it is given to us as actuality and thereby also as a discernible option; if it is another world, then we have given, for example through a fictional change of our actual experiences, its option, its possible actuality, and, living in this fiction, we are then not the actual subjects, but the fictionally changed subjects, <namely> changed insofar as we have, or rather, have had exactly the differently shaped experiences, instead of what we had experienced, and experience, and preview experientially, and [insofar as we] have previews according to them, whereby our total life of course would have another content.

If we thus talk with reason of the option that we (and an I as such), could also be as men in the world without our experiencing this world and our bodiliness in it, and our soul life as psychophysically belonging to it, then we have thereby necessarily immerse ourselves into another I, or rather, into a change of our own I, or else into a whole subject community, in whose accordant external experience the world would be given with our bodies and our psychophysically correspondent soul life, although with such a mad soul life that we, unlike other men, were experienced by them as „madmen“, who do not experience anything of the world and of themselves as men in their own inner life.

But now we need to consider that for the men, who shall still be able to experience us as a man, even if as a mad one, certain conditions of the option of empathy need to be fulfilled. For their being able to cognize us as men, [358] not only our body must be experienced by them as a thing, but as a body - as analogon to their own body, and not only externally as a similar thing, but simply as a body, which, like their own, is a body functioning as an organ of perception in the external perception, thereby experienced by them as freely movable and moved, likewise as effective in the I-hit, I-push, etc. My body needs to be experienceable for them through empathy of a corresponding internality, and this experience of empathy needs to be able to consequently verify itself for them. In all my madness my changing body appearances, my visible movements, my vocal utterances, etc., need to make an understandable sense consequently verifying itself as a perceiving regarding and noticing-by-seeing, as a touching, as mute utterance, evincing astonishment, fright, angst, and the like. But simply thereby it emerges that my pure subjectivity as a soul cannot be freely variable within the eidos pure subjectivity as such. A soul is rather bound to a rule of possible mental living, without which it could not empathatically express itself for a possible mundane subjectivity within a body, let alone that it could act as an animal subject without any such rule within a body that is experienced by [the soul] itself. If it shall itself be a world experiencing subjectivity (and apart from that a subjectivity however unreasonable, animal, stupid), then the universal structure of accordant external experience already implies a far-reaching regulation. But if we try to free it however far from this structure, then anyway we need to take into consideration the regulation, according to that which has been explained above, that presupposes an empathetic apperception of the subjectivity as an animal and human one. The madness necessarily has its limits. And I believe that we can even discern that the external experience and experienced surrounding world necessarily also belongs to the content that is necessarily to be empathized into a body, and to be verified, however low the constitutional step and the constitutive sense of the proper bodiliness and bodily surrounding world experienced by the empathized subject may be. The basic measure of all empathy is the man experiencing himself in psychophysical self-experience in the total frame of objective experience [359] with his originally experienced internal bodiliness and internal mentality. All empathizing interpretation follows the series of steps of the animal species, and a corresponding incremental change of the contents of empathy takes place by that, whereas still a core structure “I - body - surrounding reality“ obviously remains.

Accordingly it is clear that the task of an eidetic psychology does not coincide with an eidetic science of the pure subjectivity. The eidetic psychology is a regional ontology like the pure natural science. It has <as a theme> the eidos of an abstractively to be exhibited universal structure of a possible world that is freely variable in the abstraction, like the pure space- and space-time-doctrine has such an abstract universal structure as a theme.

Prior to that there is the actual world, to which the researcher himself consciously belongs, and it is as given in original experience the basic example to the researching eidetician for the changing construction of pure possibilities, and for the formation of the eidos possible world as such, and the execution of eidetically mundane ontology. The researcher, turned to the world, changes the possible world in the execution. And since he necessarily proceeds intuitively, he thereby changes, without being thematically aware of it, his possible experience of the world, that is, in such a way, that again a universal style of the accordance, a universal experiential structure going through the life of consciousness remains. Regarded closely, world is implicitly meant along, as in the normal sense of apperception, presupposed it is an intersubjectively being, or rather, experienceable world. Therefore an open infinity of human subjects (with me as a man), as subjects of their and of the common world as a surrounding world, is presupposed for every draft of a universal ontology.

1. 21st October 1926. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)